Due to concerns about human trafficking, Japan restricted the flow of Filipino migrants into performing arts jobs, effectively closing the Philippines' largest migration channel. I exploit heterogeneity in the impact of this migration restriction across the Philippines to examine the effect of circular migration on sending-country labor markets.
Introduction
Circular labor migration is often recognized as a key tool for development (Clemens, 2011) . Sending countries benefit through increases in schooling (Cox-Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Dinkelman and Mariotti, 2016; Theoharides, 2016) and household investment (Woodruff and Zenteno, 2007; Yang, 2008) , as well as reductions in risk (Yang and Choi, 2007) . The economics literature largely identifies effects of circular migration on sending economies by examining shocks to the income and remittances of existing migrants, such as through exchange rate shocks (Yang, 2008) or unexpected windfalls (Ambler, Aycinena and Yang, 2013) . While such strategies identify effects at the intensive margin, they are unable to identify the effects of migration at the extensive margin which is most often the target of policy. To remedy this, a new, smaller literature identifies the effects of circular migration using policy variation, either through barriers to migration (Dinkelman and Mariotti, 2016) or through the allocation of scarce migration opportunities (Gibson and McKenzie, 2014) . This enables the explicit analysis of the welfare benefits of sending migrants abroad, rather than solely the benefits from changes in the income of existing migrants. Further, given global labor markets for potential migrants, this strategy allows for the measurement of the fungibility of migration opportunities, an important measure for understanding the resiliency of the overseas workforce from developing countries to migration policy.
In this paper, I use an abrupt change in immigration policy to provide empirical evidence on the effects of circular migration on sending-country labor markets. Specifically, I answer the question: What is the effect of the closure of a major migration channel on the labor market behavior of households in the country of origin? To answer this question, I exploit a policy change in Japan that imposed significant barriers on the migration of Overseas Performing Artists (Munshi, 2003; Theoharides, 2016) . Because different geographic areas of the Philippines historically sent migrants to specific destinations and in certain occupations, provinces that specialized in OPA migration received a larger treatment dosage from the policy change than other provinces.
Exploiting heterogeneity in the impact of this migration restriction across the Philippines, I employ a difference-in-differences estimation strategy using the percent of OPA employment in the province population in a base year as a continuous policy variable to define the treatment dosage.
Using this estimation strategy, I first document that the policy had its intended impact on reducing OPA migration. Next, I examine the policy's impact on total migration from the Philippines. This allows for the direct examination of the fungibility of migration opportunities. Given global labor markets for potential migrants, the elimination of a migration channel for a particular occupation or destination could lead to little or no change in total migration if migrants can easily switch to new occupations or destinations. Alternatively, such a barrier could lead to additional decreases in total migration due to negative spillovers to other occupations resulting from decreased remittance income or reduced access to migrant networks. Understanding the impacts of migration barriers and quantifying these spillovers is particularly important for developing countries that rely on exporting labor and subsequent remittance income.
I find empirical evidence of a lack of fungibility of migration opportunities and substantial negative spillovers to other migration opportunities. Moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of a province's baseline OPA share is associated with a 10.1% greater decrease in migration after the policy change. This effect is nearly twice as large as the decrease in OPA migration. Though OPAs are almost exclusively female, these negative spillovers affect both female and male migrants, with sizable negative effects among migrants in the production and service industries. Two mechanisms appear to contribute to the negative spillovers: 1.) remittances halt and household income falls, reducing the ability to afford migration costs; and 2.) recruiting agencies close, decreasing access to migration services for non-OPA migrants.
This well-intentioned migration policy results in additional adverse welfare implications in the domestic labor market. I find that labor force participation increased substantially more in high than in low OPA share provinces after the policy change. These results suggest that when migration is reduced and remittances are no longer available, households attempt to compensate by introducing individuals into the labor force who were previously unattached. While these increases in labor force participation are primarily realized through increases in employment rather than unemployment, households appear unable to compensate for lost migration opportunities and engage in less desirable domestic labor market options. Specifically, child labor increased, underemployment increased, and more individuals engaged in short-term work.
This paper contributes to both the policy and academic literatures on migration. First, from a policy standpoint, human rights issues such as trafficking are at the forefront of much of the policy debate on migration. Such policies are generally well intentioned, yet this study highlights the unintended, negative consequences on the exact population policymakers were attempting help. It adds to the debate on international efforts to curb human trafficking by extending the analysis of Akee et al. (2014) beyond the effects of foreign trafficking policies on domestic trafficking to directly examine the effects on more general domestic labor market outcomes.
Second, this paper adds to the literature on the impacts of circular migration on sending countries, documenting important welfare implications of migration barriers on both the overseas and domestic labor markets. This builds upon previous work on the adverse effects of migration barriers on educational investment by Dinkelman and Mariotti (2016) by: 1.) focusing on welfare outcomes related to both international and domestic labor market choice rather than educational investment, and 2.) exploiting a migration barrier imposed by the migrant-receiving country rather than the sending country, a distinction that is important for external validity given the recent prevalence of barriers imposed by receiving countries.
Finally, my paper highlights the lack of fungibility in migration opportunities and provides a unique opportunity to measure the unintended, negative spillovers to other types of migration as a result of migration policy. Given current worldwide tension surrounding migration policy, this study's results can help policy makers in migrant-sending countries predict the resiliency of their overseas and domestic workforces to changes in destination country migration policy, and thus develop better strategies to cope with imposed migration barriers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on migration from the Philippines with a focus on overseas performing artists in Japan and the subsequent anti-trafficking campaign that led to their decline. Section 3 discusses the data used in the analysis. The methodology is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.
Background

Filipino Migration
International migration is a common labor market option in the Philippines. The Philippine Overseas Employment Program, established in 1974, promotes contract migration of its citizens, and approximately 2% of the population migrates annually in a variety of occupations and to numerous destination countries. This is legal and temporary migration through licensed recruitment agencies, and contract duration is about two years on average. Workers are classified as either new hires who are working abroad on a new labor contract or as rehires renewing an existing contract. Family members of migrants typically remain at home in the Philippines. Contract migration is an increasingly common global phenomenon, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. While the Philippines was the first country to establish temporary contract migration as a labor market alternative, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Tajikistan, among others, have all adopted or are in the process of adopting similar programs (Asis and Agunias, 2012; Rajan and Misha, 2007; Ray, Sinha and Chaudhuri, 2007; World Bank, 2011 (Barayuga, 2014) . Theoharides (2016) shows that province-level historic destination and occupation shares are a strong predictor of variation in contemporaneous province-level migration rates. This emphasizes the importance of migrant networks whether through social networks or agglomeration effects, such as the prevalence of middlemen to facilitate the migration process to certain destinations or in certain occupations. to be female than the average non-OPA contract migrant (96% versus 67%).
Overseas Performing Artist Migration
They are also younger, with an average age of 25 years compared to 32 years. This is primarily because the maximum age for OPAs hired by Japan was 35 years of age, while the minimum age was 18 years (Parrenas, 2008) . OPA wages are very high with average monthly wages equaling $1,842 compared to $417 for other contract migrants (and $276 for domestic helpers). The contract durations are also much shorter, with an average duration of 4.6 months compared to 20.5 months. Migrants from the Philippines on average are quite well educated when compared with the Philippine population as a whole (Theoharides, 2016), yet OPAs are an exception. The average contract worker has 13.3 years of education, or almost a college degree, given the 10-year primary and secondary education system in the Philippines. OPAs, on the other hand, have 9.4 years of education on average, meaning that the average OPA has not earned a high school diploma.
The term "Overseas Performing Artist" is an umbrella term encompassing women employed as choreographers, dancers, composers, musicians, and singers.
The nature of the employment of these young, unskilled women is as hostesses in gentlemen's clubs in Japan. Prior to 2005, recruiting agencies typically sent a photograph to prospective Japanese employers to aid their selection of OPAs.
While POEA conducted an audition prior to deployment, recruiting agencies would ensure selected OPAs passed the audition, often through impersonation (Barayuga, 2014) .
1
The actual work of OPAs in Japan is largely debated. Media reports and a number of studies assert that OPA employment was exploitive and essentially forced prostitution (Douglass, 2003; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2004) .
Alternatively, Parrenas (2011) contends that while a certain level of intimacy was expected of OPAs, forced prostitution was uncommon. In addition to the controversial nature of employment, many OPAs became attached to the Yakuza (Japanese organized crime) and were often victims of debt bondage through fees incurred during training or the confiscation of passports. OPAs typically did not receive their salaries until the end of the contract in order to ensure they did not leave prior to the completion of the contract (Parrenas, 2008) . 1 Selected OPAs without performance talent would send someone else to engage in the audition for them. Prior to the policy change in Japan, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, the government agency tasked with processing contracts for temporary migrants, was in the process of implementing a fingerprint scanning system in order to combat issues of impersonation in the interview process. The system was scrapped once OPA migration halted in response to the policy change (Barayuga, 2014) . the requirements for hiring OPAs bound for Japan. Before 2005 applicants were eligible for OPA employment as long as they met the requirements of a government agency in their country of origin (Parrenas, 2008) .
2 Through a bilateral agreement with Japan, the Philippines only required OPAs to complete a training certificate of 6 months or less in duration and pass an audition. In response to the trafficking accusations, Japan revised their policy to require all OPAs to have 2 years of education or training in performance, and the Philippine government was no longer eligible to evaluate performers (Parrenas, 2008) .
3 Because the population of OPAs from the Philippines was historically poorly educated, these policy changes imposed huge barriers to migration for traditional OPAs.
Most experienced OPAs were not able to return to Japan for employment, and with limited economic opportunities at home, took part in migrant reintegration programs sponsored by the Philippine government (Parrenas, 2008) .
The changes in outmigration of OPAs in response to the policy change can easily be seen from the plot of new OPA contracts over time shown in Figure   1 . In response to the ban, annual OPA migration to Japan plummeted from OPA migration returned to and surpassed its previous levels. 4 In Figure 1 , I also 2 Applicants were also eligible for OPA employment in Japan if they had 2 years of either training or work experience as a performing artist.
3 While higher education standards for migrants may cause long run increases in education through aspirational effects of a higher expected wage premium (Shrestha, 2016) , in the case of OPAs, poverty is believed to be the major impetus for migration, and stigmas attached to OPA migration limit the aspirational effects. Further, Theoharides (2016) finds that effects on human capital in the Philippines are primarily due to remittances rather than aspirations.
4 The late 1980's and early 1990's included multiple attempts by the Philippine government to ban the hire of female workers (OPAs and other occupation groups), but these bans were compare OPA migration to other migration from the Philippines. Other than the aforementioned policy changes, OPA migration follows the overall pattern of total migration, increasing through the 1990's with a slight dip in 2002. After the OPA policy change, total migration in the Philippines continues to climb.
OPA migration was not distributed evenly across the Philippines. Figure   2a plots the province-level OPA migration rates in 1993. OPA migration in 1993 was concentrated in the provinces surrounding Manila as well as a few provinces in the Visayas and in southern Mindanao. Figure 2b OPAs were required to attend a training center prior to deployment, Filipinas from the same province typically enrolled in a training center together, usually one that was recommended by a person related to the trainee (Barayuga, 2014) .
Data
I use an original dataset of all new migrant departures from the Philippines between 1992 and 2009, which I construct by merging two government adminshort-lived. For instance, in 1991 President Corazon Aquino ordered a total ban of OPA deployment, but it was rescinded almost immediately when recruiters promised to support a new system of deployment (Kapunan, 1996) . The deployment of domestic helpers was banned in January 1988, but by May, new agreements had been reached with most destination countries (Mydans, 1988) . The OPA policy change differs from these other policies since it was imposed by the destination country.
istrative datasets from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) and the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration (OWWA). POEA records all new migration episodes from the Philippines in order to verify that workers are paid the wages stipulated by their contract. The data include name and demographics, as well as destination, occupation, employer, recruiting agency, and wages. OWWA, on the other hand, is concerned with the welfare of the workers and their families. While recording similar identifying information and demographics, OWWA's key variable of interest is the home address of the migrant so that in the event of natural disasters or other turmoil in the destination country, they can contact the migrant's family. Combining the POEA and OWWA data creates a unique dataset that includes both the occupation and destination of the migrant as well as their home address in the Philippines.
5,6
To calculate each province's base share of OPAs, I aggregate individual records annually by province, and divide by the working population at baseline as calculated from the Philippine Census of Population. I define the base period as 1993, though the results are also robust to using 1992 as the base year.
7 I also calculate both the overall number of new migrants and the number of new migrants by occupation and gender at the province-year level.
I use the 1992-2011 Labor Force Surveys (LFS) from the Philippine Statistical Authority (PSA) to calculate domestic labor market outcomes and obtain a number of covariates. The LFS is a quarterly household survey conducted on a rotating panel of households, and the province is the smallest geographic unit at which it is representative. The survey asks about the recent employment status and work history of all members of the household of twelve or more years of 5 I match the data using first name, middle name, last name, date of birth, destination country, gender, and year of departure using probabilistic or fuzzy matching techniques as discussed by Winkler (2004) . The match rate is approximately 90% for 1993, the year in which the baseline values are calculated. See Theoharides (2016) for further details.
6 Unfortunately, home address of the migrant was not recorded by OWWA between 1999 and 2003.
7 I use 1993 as the base year because province of origin is non-missing 86% of the time compared to 84% of the time in 1992.
age, including overseas members of the household. I use these data to construct labor force participation, unemployment, employment, and underemployment rates, as well as the rate of child labor.
8 Table 2 shows summary statistics for both datasets. The total migration rate from the POEA data is 0.37%, while the baseline OPA share is 0.06%, indicating that OPA migration was a substantial portion of total Filipino migration. 4.0% of the labor force is unemployed over the sample period from 1998 to 2011, while 66.6% was employed. Just over three percent of children between the ages of 5 and 12 worked at least one hour in the past week, and nearly five percent of the working-age population is underemployed, defined as those individuals that are employed but seeking additional work to supplement their current employment.
Approximately 12% of the working-age population report that their jobs are not permanent. Provinces above the median baseline OPA share tend to have higher populations, total migration, and unemployment and lower rates of child employment compared to provinces below the median share. Overall, migration in the Philippines is increasing over time, while labor market characteristics remain relatively constant.
Empirical Strategy
To obtain a causal estimate of the effect of the OPA policy change on migration and employment outcomes, I exploit the fact that, due to historic migration networks, provinces with a larger share of OPAs as a portion of their population will have more affected workers as a result of the ban compared to provinces with a smaller share of OPAs. Figure 3 plots the baseline shares for each province (circles). There is substantial variation in the OPA shares at baseline, indicat-ing that provinces will experience different dosages of treatment in response to the OPA policy change. The treatment dosage that each province receives in response to the policy change is the vertical distance between the 1993 base share (circles) and the 2009 OPA migration rate (triangles) for each province.
Provinces are sorted by 1993 shares such that the further right a province is in the figure, the larger the effect of the policy change in the province.
Formally, I implement a difference-in-differences style analysis with a continuous treatment variable. While one option would be to assign a binary treatment variable, the choice of a binary treatment and control variable is somewhat arbitrary so I prefer the continuous treatment variable.
9 I estimate the following equation:
where Y pt is some outcome variable for province p in year t; P ost t is a dummy ShareOP A p0 is the number of OPAs in province p divided by the total working population in 1993, the base period. α p are province fixed effects, γ t are year fixed effects, and pt is the error term, which I cluster at the province level. 77 provinces are used in the analysis, and all regressions are weighted by the province population in 1990, though the results are robust to dropping the weights (see Table 4 ).
11
β 1 estimates the differential effect of the policy change for a province with a 1 percentage point higher baseline OPA share. The identifying assumption 9 I provide several checks of this continuous assignment in Section 5 and use a more traditional binary approach in Appendix A.
10 When examining the migration outcomes, because of the lack of address data in 1999 to 2003 the pre-period includes 1996-1998 and 2004. 11 In order to maintain consistent geographic definitions of provinces over time, I assign all provinces to their 1992 geographic boundaries.
for β 1 to be a valid estimate of the causal effect of the OPA ban is that in the absence of the policy change, the outcome variable of interest in provinces with different baseline shares would have moved in parallel. Differences between high OPA share provinces and low OPA share provinces, as shown in Table 2 , are removed by the inclusion of fixed effects. To further alleviate concern of differential trending in the absence of the policy, I include province-level prepolicy controls in the base year (1993) interacted with a linear time trend.
12 In Section 5, I show for all outcomes that there is no evidence of differential trending by base shares prior to the OPA policy change, suggesting the the identifying assumption is valid.
Results
Effects on OPA Migration
To establish the first stage effect of the policy, I first estimate the effect of the policy change on the OPA migration rate. If there is no effect, the OPA policy change should not differentially affect total migration or other labor market outcomes in high versus low OPA sending areas. Table 3 Table 3 . If networks have no effect on future migration levels, I expect a point estimate of zero, while if they are perfectly predictive I expect a point estimate equal to one. Provinces with a 1 percentage point higher OPA base share have an OPA migration rate in 2004 that is 0.43 percentage points higher. The result is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, while networks are not perfectly predictive of future migration patterns, there are substantial network effects. Given the strength of OPA migrant networks, for the effect of the ban to be fully realized the OPA rate should decline by -0.43 percentage points which is statistically indistinguishable from the estimate in Table 3 of -0.465.
Given the concern about potential differential trending of the outcome variable by baseline OPA share, I test for differential pre-trends in the OPA migration rate by estimating the relationship between the baseline OPA share and the change in the OPA migration rate in the pre-period using the following equation:
where t is the pre-period years 1996-1998, 13 ∆(Y pt ) is the change in the province-level outcome variable in province p from year t − 1 to year t, X p0 is a vector of covariates at baseline, and γ t are year fixed effects. β 1 is reported in the second row of Table 3 , Column 5. I find that a 1 percentage point increase in the OPA migration rate at baseline is associated with a tiny change in the OPA migration rate that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that the OPA migration rate in provinces with higher baseline OPA shares was not changing differentially relative to lower share provinces prior to the policy.
One might be concerned that the effect on OPA migration is driven by a small number of provinces with very high OPA base shares. Figure 3 shows there were four extreme outliers, each of the four districts of Metro Manila. In Table 4 , Panel A, Column 1, I drop each of these districts with little change to the point estimates. I cannot reject that the estimates are the same as the main result, suggesting that these outlier provinces are not driving the results. I also drop all four districts of Metro Manila. While the point estimate is somewhat larger in magnitude, the results are again robust to this exclusion (p-value on test of equality to Row 1 is 0.63). The results are also robust to the exclusion of 1990 population weights.
Another concern Figure 3 raises is that baseline OPA shares should not be specified linearly. As one way to explore robustness to this concern, I restrict the sample to just those provinces above the median and mean OPA migration rate.
As shown in Figure 
Spillovers: Effects on Total Migration
The previous section establishes that the policy change did have the intended effect, and OPA migration declined by the anticipated amount of -0.43 percentage points. While the OPA policy change only directly affected the migration of OPAs, the ban may affect migration in other occupations and destinations, causing effects on migration that are smaller or larger than the magnitude of the ban itself. This natural experiment provides a unique opportunity to test for the fungibility of migration opportunities and the presence of spillover effects.
Since many migration policies refer specifically to migrants in certain occupations and are destination specific, it is important to quantify such effects in order to understand the implications of migration policies for migrant-sending countries.
If migration opportunities are fungible, OPA migrants can easily switch between occupation categories and destinations, leading to effects on total migration less than than the magnitude of the ban. For instance, a prospective OPA migrant may instead move abroad as a domestic helper. In the case of migration from the Philippines, such switching behavior seems unlikely for several reasons.
First, the importance of migrant networks results in rigidity in the local labor market that makes it more difficult for "OPA provinces" to easily become "domestic helper provinces." Second, there is an excess supply of migrants from the Philippines (McKenzie, Theoharides and Yang, 2014), and so it seems unlikely that OPAs can easily switch when their employment opportunities are no longer available since a surplus of potential and more highly educated migrants already exists. Further, most migrant occupations require considerably more education than the average 9 years of education obtained by OPAs (Theoharides, 2016).
On the other hand, negative spillover effects may cause reductions in migration greater than the restriction itself would impose, resulting in adverse effects on occupations other than the OPAs directly affected by the policy change. Such effects may occur for two main reasons. First, when migration opportunities are reduced, this will lead to the elimination of remittances from these migrants.
Even if OPA migrants are able to switch to a different occupation, given their low levels of education it is very unlikely they will have the same high earnings.
If households are credit constrained or otherwise unable to compensate for this lost income, they may no longer be able to afford the migration fees for other household members to migrate to other destinations or in other occupations.
Angelucci (2015) and Bazzi (2016) find that positive income shocks lead to increased international migration. Based on their results, if the OPA policy change led to a negative shock to household income, other types of migration may fall and migration may decline by more than the magnitude of the barrier.
Second, negative spillovers may occur due to changes in access to the migration process: namely the presence of recruitment agencies or off-site recruiting and information. Recruiting agencies typically recruit for possible OPAs as well as several other occupations, and legally they can receive fees equal to one month's wage. After the policy change, high fees from OPAs are no longer possi-ble, and recruiting agencies may close given that this lucrative occupation is no longer an option for recruiting. As a result, recruitment (and thus employment)
in other occupations will also fall.
I examine the effect of the policy change on the total migration rate from the province to determine if migration opportunities are fungible or if negative spillovers are present. The results, shown in Table 3 Table 4 , with the exception of dropping all four districts of metro Manila.
Recall from Table 2 Given these negative spillovers from the OPA ban, it is important to understand whether they are concentrated among certain types of migrants in order to determine which workers are vulnerable to adverse spillovers. In Table 5 , I
estimate the effect of the ban on occupation-specific migration rates for the three largest categories of Filipino migrants: production workers, professional workers, and service workers.
15 Examples of occupations classified as production workers include factory workers and laborers, professional workers include medical professionals and engineers, and service workers include domestic helpers and caregivers. OPA migrants are categorized as professional workers, though I treat them as their own category in Table 5 . Both production and service workers are adversely affected by the policy change, while there appears to be no effect on professional workers. Compared to professional workers (excluding OPAs), production and service workers have much lower skill levels, suggesting that more vulnerable portions of the population are subject to these adverse spillovers. Checks for pre-trends indicate that there is a slight statistically significant pre-trend for service workers, though the main effect is much larger in magnitude than the pre-trend, suggesting that it is unlikely that the result is driven exclusively by differential pre-trends.
I further examine these spillovers by estimating the effects of the policy change on male versus female migrants. Because OPA migration is largely fe-male, the direct effect of the ban should be felt exclusively by females. The spillover effects, however, could be experienced by both genders, and the occupation results on production workers (traditionally a mix of male and female workers) imply that there may be spillover effects onto male migration as well. I examine this explicitly by looking at the response of the male and female migration rates to the OPA policy change. If I find a non-zero point estimate for males, this suggests that there are spillover effects for men from the ban on predominantly female OPA migration. After the policy change, both male and female migration rates decline in high OPA provinces compared to low OPA provinces, though the results are not precisely estimated for men (see Table 5 ). 
Spillover Mechanisms
Given the presence of negative spillovers to other types of migration, I next examine the underlying mechanisms driving the results. I explore two potential channels through which these negative spillover effects may occur: her contract 2 times, but returns to the Philippines for a one month vacation after the completion of each contract, 18 she will be paid 9 months of wages.
19
This yields lost OPA wages of $2,088,828. There are also 41 fewer non-OPA migrants. They earn an average wage of $417, and work for a contract length of 20.5 months. I assume they are paid for 11 months after recruiting fees are paid.
Thus, they lose wages equal to $188,067. Together, this yields a conservative estimate of lost migrant wages equal to $2,276,895.
20
17 POEA and author's calculations. 18 This high frequency of vacations is unlikely, but provides a more conservative estimate of lost wages. Filipino migrants often vacation in the Philippines for the month of December.
19 The OPA works for 4.6 months, with one month's wages paid to the agency. She then comes home for 1 month, works 4.6 months with no fee due to contract renewal, comes home for 1 month, and then works the remaining 0.8 months of the year.
20 Note that not all of this lost wage income is part of the mechanism. While only the loss of OPA wages is part of the mechanism, lost non-OPA wages should be included to calculate I compare this to the amount of lost household income. Based on the 2000 Census, the average province in the Philippines has 184,037 households. With $12 lower annual income for each household, income falls by $2,208,440. Thus, household income falls by slightly less than this conservative estimate of total lost migrant wages. Given the recent findings by Angelucci (2015) and Bazzi (2016) that increased income leads to increased migration, these negative income shocks as a result of the policy change are likely responsible for at least part of the effects on total migration.
I turn now to access to recruiting agencies as a possible mechanism for negative migration spillovers. The administrative microdata used in this paper include the recruiting agency used by the migrant. In the aggregate, as total migration increased over time, the number of recruiting agencies unsurprisingly increased substantially (see Appendix Figure 1 ). However, the number of agencies did decrease slightly following the OPA policy change. I formally examine the effect of the policy change on the presence of recruiting agencies by creating a new dependent variable that is defined as the number of recruiting agencies used by OPAs in a province in the previous year that are closed in the current year.
I estimate the effect of the policy change on the closure of agencies that sent OPA migrants (Table 6 , Column 3). Scaling the point estimate of 38.7 by the interquartile range, 1.2 more OPA-sending agencies closed in high relative to low OPA provinces. With a mean of 0.45 closed OPA agencies in the pre-period, this is a 256% increase in the number of closed OPA agencies in high versus low OPA provinces relative to the pre-period. Most agencies that send OPA migrants abroad also send other types of migrants. On average, agencies that closed sent 37.8 OPA migrants and 24.4 other migrants. With 1.2 more agencies closed, this would yield approximately 29 fewer non-OPA migrants as a result of the total wage loss from the policy change. the agency closure. Even if only a fraction of these migrants are unable to use an alternative agency, this represents a substantial share of the negative spillover of approximately 40 non-OPA migrants (Table 3) .
One final possibility is that recruiting agency operators run multiple recruiting agencies, and, as a result of decreased profits from the OPA ban, may close non-OPA agencies as well. Column 4 indicates that non-OPA sending recruiting agencies declined as a result of the policy change, suggesting potentially even more non-OPA migrants with reduced access to migration services.
Domestic Employment
The Japanese policy change led to substantial declines in OPA migration, overall migration, and household income. Given these results, it seems likely that household welfare in the Philippines may decline in response to the policy change as well. To explicitly test this, I examine the domestic labor market outcomes of individuals in the Philippines in response to the OPA policy. Households may reallocate labor market choices within the household in an attempt to compensate for lost overseas wages. For instance, individuals who were not previously part of the labor force may seek employment, or children may be forced to engage in employment. The influx of former migrants into the labor force may also increase the labor supply, but this effect is likely trivial given the change in migration of approximately 167 migrants. Table 7 presents the effects of the OPA policy change on province-level labor market outcomes. First, in Panel A, Column 1, I examine whether the OPA ban and subsequent reductions in migration and lost income translate into increases in labor force participation.
21 I find that provinces with a higher baseline OPA 21 Labor force participation is defined as the number of unemployed and employed individuals out of the total working aged population in the province. Migrant workers are not counted in either the numerator or denominator in the estimates presented here. However, the results are robust to counting migrants as employed and as part of the working population.
share experience a 0.27% larger change in labor force participation (Column 1). The OPA policy change almost exclusively affects the migration of females aged 18 to 35, and the effect on labor force participation is larger for women (Panel C), though the effect is positive and statistically significant among males as well (Panel B). Panels D and E indicate that the increases in labor force participation are concentrated among young women rather than old women. In terms of magnitudes, a 0.27% increase in total labor force participation means 3,896 more labor market participants in the average province. Given the 167 fewer migrants in high OPA provinces, this implies nearly 23 more individuals in the labor force for every lost migrant.
This seemingly large increase can be put into context by considering three facts. First, these 23 workers span several households, not just the migrant's household. Theoharides (2016) calculates that for every new migrant that goes abroad, approximately four households receive remittances, and this statistic would likely be higher for high-wage migrants such as OPAs. Second, nonremittance receiving households previously benefited from the high OPA wages through multiplier effects in the local economy. Third, note that the average OPA earns $1,842 USD per month, compared to $87 per month for the average worker in the Philippines. With 23 more workers in the labor force, this would lead to $2,001 USD per month if all workers were employed at the average wage, which unlikely given that OPA households are some of the least skilled in the Philippines. With an unemployment rate of 3.8% in the pre-period, this conservatively suggests that 1 of these workers will be unemployed, so an upper bound on the increase in earnings is $1914 USD. Thus, the scale of the labor force participation results can be completely explained as an attempt to compensate for the lost wages from migration.
Given the large effect on domestic labor force participation, it is important to uncover whether these new participants result in increases in unemployment either because they are unable to find work or because they displace other workers, 22 or whether they are able to compensate for lost migration opportunities by obtaining employment. There is a positive effect of the OPA ban on unemployment overall and among males and females, however, it is only statistically significant among females (Table 7 , Panel C). For each migrant that no longer goes abroad, there are 2.4 (=398/167) additional females unemployed domestically. This effect is experienced equally by old and young females, though it is only statistically significant for older workers (Panel E). Given the large increase in labor market participation for young women and the more modest increases in their unemployment, it appears that young women may crowd older women out of their jobs.
The employment results corroborate this story. Employment increases overall, and the effect seems to be driven by employment of women, specifically young women. The effects on employment are substantially larger than the effects on unemployment, suggesting that increases in labor force participation result in increases in employment. One caveat to the employment results, however, is that there is a marginally significant pre-trend on both the total employment result and the male employment result. Out of the 40 outcomes shown in Table   7 , these are the only two significant pre-trends, roughly what would be expected due to chance. 23 Further, the magnitudes of the pre-trends are much smaller than the main effects, suggesting that pre-trends only explain at most part of the main effect.
Since the majority of the effect on labor force participation appears to be due to increases in employment, this begs the question of whether welfare in the Philippines actually declined, or if households are able to partially or fully com-
22
The unemployment rate is defined as the number of unemployed individuals out of the working-aged population. Individuals are defined as unemployed if they are out of work, actively seeking work, and available for work. The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed individuals.
23 The pre-trends in Table 7 are estimated over a pre-period from 1998 to 2004, a substantially longer sample period than is possible in earlier tables. pensate for lost wages by changing labor market decisions at home. To provide evidence of this, I estimate the effects of the policy change on underemployment, short term employment, total hours worked, and child labor.
24 About 5.5% more individuals are underemployed in the 75th percentile of OPA provinces relative to the 25th percentile, with similar increases in underemployment for both men and women. Short term employment, defined as seasonal, casual, or temporary employment, also increases more in high OPA share provinces after the policy change. This is a less desirable form of employment due both to lower wages and the temporary nature of employment, and so the increased likelihood of this type of work suggests that households are more desperate for paid employment when migration opportunities become more limited. There appears to be no overall effect on total hours worked per worker.
Finally, I examine the effect of the OPA ban on child employment (Columns 7 and 8). One way that households can make up for lost wages is by taking children out of school or putting them to work. I find that the OPA ban results in a 2.1% higher rate of child labor in high compared to low OPA provinces.
25
Given there were on average 5,052 children aged 5 to 12 working in a province in the pre-period, this means 105 more children are engaged in at least one hour of work per week in high OPA provinces compared to low OPA provinces.
Considering the total decline of 167 migrants, for each migrant who no longer goes abroad 0.63 more children are employed. To be clear, one hour of work is not synonymous with participation in hazardous forms of child labor. It is, however, indicative of adjustment of domestic labor market choices in response to the policy change. Rates of child labor increase in high OPA provinces relative 24 The underemployment rate is defined as those individuals who are employed, but report actively searching for additional work in addition to their current job, out of of the total working-aged population.
25 Child employment is split into two age brackets: children aged 5 to 12 and children aged 13 to 15. It is defined as the number of children in a given age bracket working at least 1 hour per week out of the same-aged population. Hours worked are not collected for children under age 16, so I am limited to this definition. The LFS also does not differentiate between hazardous work and non-hazardous work.
to low OPA provinces for both males and females, as well as for 13 to 15 year olds. Checks for pre-trends indicate that there is not differential trending in the pre-period, and thus the identifying assumption is not violated. Table 4 shows that the results are generally robust for all main labor market outcomes.
The effects of the policy change on domestic labor market outcomes indicate that when migration opportunities decrease, households try to compensate by altering their domestic labor market decisions by increasing both labor force participation and employment. However, while employment increases and income falls by less than the lost wages, individuals engage in less desirable labor market opportunities, making it unsurprising that households are unable to fully offset the lost migration earnings. Thus, while this policy change sought to eliminate a potentially exploitive migration channel, there appears to be a tradeoff in terms of the consequences in the domestic labor market and overall household welfare.
26 In addition to providing evidence on the unintended welfare implications of a well-intentioned migration policy, these results directly contribute to the literature on the effects of migration on sending countries and illustrate the substantial costs from reductions in migration for migrant-sending countries.
Conclusion
Circular labor migration is considered a key tool for economic development, with substantial positive benefits for origin communities. I exploit an abrupt change in immigration policy in Japan that effectively ended the migration of Filipino overseas performing artists, the largest and highest paid occupation for Filipino migrants, to provide evidence on the effects of migration on origin-26 Appendix B examines the dynamic effects of the policy change. Effects on migration appear to persist as more time elapses from the policy change, while effects on labor force participation and individuals seeking additional work increase. This suggests that initially households are able to cope with lower rates of migration, but over time they seek alternative domestic labor market options due to the loss of income from abroad. country labor markets. This policy change had a differential impact across geographic areas of the Philippines and allows a unique test of the fungibility of migration opportunities.
I find that in response to the policy change total migration decreases more in provinces with a high relative to low baseline OPA share. This indicates a lack of fungibility in migration opportunities. Further, negative spillovers result from the policy change, with migration declining by more than the policy alone would dictate. These spillovers occur for both women and men, with production and service workers particularly adversely affected. Domestically, labor force participation and employment increase in high relative to low OPA provinces.
The gains in employment, however, are concentrated in less desirable options, with increases in underemployment, short-term employment, and child labor.
The results suggest that this well-intentioned migration policy had unintended, adverse consequences for the exact population the policy attempted to help. Such results have broad relevance for policy-makers globally and in migrant-sending countries. First, well-intentioned efforts to curb human trafficking may result in unintended welfare losses. Second, the apparent lack of fungibility and negative spillovers in migration opportunities are critical for policy makers in migrant-sending countries as they attempt to cope with destination country migration policies. As the global climate surrounding immigration policy becomes increasingly negative, households in poor, migrant-sending countries may be forced to dramatically alter their labor market decisions, often in suboptimal ways. To calculate the percent change (as expressed above), divide by the mean of the dependent variable in the pre-period. The check for pre-trends regresses the change in the dependent variable on the baseline OPA share, baseline controls, and year fixed effects for pre-period sample years 1996, 1997, and 1998 (N=231) . The reported coefficient is the coefficient on the baseline OPA share. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level. Table 3 are included in all specifications. Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. All regressions weighted by 1990 working population. Scaling by the interquartile range and the check for pre-trends are as described in Table 3 , with the pre-period as indicated above. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level. Table 3 . Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. All regressions are weighted by 1990 working population. The rate of labor force participation is the number of individuals either employed or unemployed out of the working-aged population. The unemployment rate is defined as the total number of unemployed individuals out of the working-aged population, where an individual is classified as unemployed if they are out of work, actively seeking work, and available to work. The underemployment rate includes individuals who are employed, but seeking additional hours or a different job. The rate of child labor is defined as the number of children in each age range working at least one hour in the past week out of the total number of children in that age range. The mean dependent variable is the mean in the pre-period. Scaling by the interquartile range and the check for pre-trends are described in the note in Table 3 using the pre-period from 1998 to 2004. The mean dependent variable listed above is for the pre-period. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level. Table 3 . Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. All regressions are weighted by 1990 working population. The rate of labor force participation is the number of individuals either employed or unemployed out of the working-aged population. The unemployment rate is defined as the total number of unemployed individuals out of the working-aged population, where an individual is classified as unemployed if they are out of work, actively seeking work, and available to work. The underemployment rate includes individuals who are employed, but seeking additional hours or a different job. The mean dependent variable is the mean in the pre-period. Scaling by the interquartile range and the check for pre-trends are described in the note in Table 3 using the pre-period from 1998 to 2004. The mean dependent variable listed above is for the pre-period. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.
one exception is for the employment rate, which, while not precisely estimated in the binary case, has the opposite sign from the main results. The results are robust to various definitions of the treatment and control group, as shown by comparing Panels A through D. 
Appendix Table A1. Results Using Propensity Score Matching
Notes: The sample in Columns 1 and 2 is as defined in Table 3 . The sample in Columns 3-8 is as defined in Table 7 . All regressions include province and year fixed effects, as well as baseline controls interacted with a time trend listed in Table 3 . Robust standard errors are clustered at the province level. All regressions weighted by 1990 working population. The propensity score is calculated by regressing the share OPA in 1993 on baseline covariates. The scaled main results row scales the main results from the continuous difference in differences estimation in Table 3 (Total Migration and OPA Migration) and Table 6 (all other outcomes) by the average percentage point change in the baseline OPA share between treatment and control provinces for comparability. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level * indicates significance at the 10% level.
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Appendix B: Dynamics
The main results in the paper all estimate the average effect of the OPA policy change on a variety of migration and domestic labor market outcomes. In actuality, the response may be dynamic and the effects of the policy change may vary for years immediately following the policy change versus years further in the future. To examine these dynamic responses and how fast adjustments take place, I estimate the following equation:
Outcome pt = β 0 +β 1 ShareOP A p0 * 1 2006 +· · ·+β 6 ShareOP A p0 * 1 2011 +β 7 X p0 * T imeT rend+α p +γ t + pt
where ShareOP A p0 * 1 2006 is the share OPA at baseline in province p interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 in the year 2006. I interact the share OPA with dummy variables for each year in the post period. Examining the point estimates on each of these variables allows me to determine the dynamic labor market response to the policy change.
Appendix Table B1 presents the results. Column 1 shows the effects on the total migration rate. The effect of the policy change persists for high baseline OPA provinces compared to low OPA provinces as more time elapses since the policy change. The effects on the OPA migration rate provide a good check: the OPA migration rate declines by approximately 0.4 percentage points more in high compared to low OPA provinces, which is exactly what one would predict given the strength of migrant networks.
In terms of the domestic labor market results, the labor force participation rate, employment rate, and underemployment rate increase the further out from the policy change. This suggests that initially households are able to cope with lower rates of OPA migration, but as time passes, they seek alternative domestic labor market options due to the loss of income from abroad. Child labor rates increase by a larger amount in high OPA provinces compared to low OPA provinces a few years after the policy change. Unemployment, however, increases in the year immediately after the policy change, but the estimates in future years are quite noisy. Overall, it appears that the policy change had a lasting effect both on migration opportunities and on domestic labor market variables.
